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1. Introduction 
The easy answer to the question ‘What are family courts for?’ is of course, in the traditional 
civil adversarial system, to make decisions and to resolve disputes. But the answer has not 
been straightforward in child and family disputes, and recently it has become even less clear 
cut. This article is intended to examine how the role of the family court has been changing in 
the context of contact disputes, why it has changed and what the implications of the latest 
developments might be. It will suggest that there is now a blurring of the roles of adjudication 
and social work intervention and consider what this might lead to. 
 
2. The Challenges 
The problems faced by the Family Courts in disputes about children have increased in number 
and in complexity over the years. And the demands made on the courts by policy-makers, the 
legislature and the public have grown as new problems have presented themselves.  
 
In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, no-one questioned the need for divorce courts 
to make decisions about children and the power was not contentious. The decisions were 
amenable to judicial determination because they involved the use of rules of thumb (such as 
the mother’s adultery), or common sense.1 Indeed decisions about children were subsidiary to 
the question of whether the divorce would be granted.2
                                                 
* My thanks to Christine Piper and Alison Diduck for their comments on earlier drafts. 
  
1 Once the problem became defined as ‘psychological’ there were calls for abandonment of 
these rues of thumb (J. Brophy, ‘Child Care and the Growth of Power: The Status of Mothers 
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After World War II, the welfare of the child came to occupy centre stage in relation to 
disputes after divorce and a need for courts to be informed about welfare issues was 
identified.3  The Finer Committee, reporting in 1974, recommended that the court should 
provide facilities for conciliation and have trained staff to assist with matters requiring social 
work assistance and advice.4
 
 The task of the court was clearly becoming more complex.  
The powers of the court were revisited during the drafting of the Children Act 1989. This 
statute was intended to embody a comprehensive code dealing with children and their welfare. 
In the context of private law, the legislation was intended to address a number of concerns 
that had preoccupied Government, legal and welfare professionals and the Law Commission5 
in the 1980s. Chief among these was a perceived need for continuity in order to promote 
children’s well-being and, more specifically, the need for children to maintain their 
relationships with both parents.  However there was also a growing awareness of the limits of 
legal action.6
                                                                                                                                                        
in Child Custody Disputes’ in  J. Brophy and C. Smart (eds.),  Women in Law: Explorations 
in Law, Family and Sexuality (London: Routledge and Kegan Hall, 1985) p 106. 
  Doubts were beginning to surface about the usefulness of court intervention in 
determining arrangements, and particularly contact arrangements, for children after separation 
2 S. Cretney, Family Law in the Twentieth Century. A History (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2003/5) pp 576, 743. 
3 Ibid. p743. 
4 DHSS, Report of the Committee on One-Parent Families, Vol 1 (London: HMSO, 1974), 
para 4.283. 
5 The Law Commission, Working Paper no 96 Family Law: Review of Child Law: Custody 
(London: HMSO,1986) esp at para 3.7. 
6 See C. Piper, The Responsible Parent. A Study in Divorce Mediation (London: Harvester 
Wheatsheaf, 1993), p 9.  
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or divorce.7
 
  There were concerns about the effects of parental conflict on children and the 
role of the court process in exacerbating this. Litigation was coming to be regarded as not 
only costly but also as counter-productive. There were, therefore, different problems 
demanding different solutions. 
The solution to the problem of satisfying the perceived need for children to maintain their 
relationships with both parents after separation or divorce was to prioritize contact with the 
non-resident parent. Courts had already begun to attach greater importance to contact in the 
1970s and by the 1990s there had developed a strong presumption, now modified in Re L8 to 
become an ‘assumption’, in favour of contact. In Re L, for example, the court referred with 
approval to an earlier case, Re O,9
 
  where it was said that it is ‘almost always’ in the child’s 
best interests to have contact.  
The main response to the concerns about cost, conflict and the deficiencies of the court as the 
forum for decision-making was to seek to change the way disputes were dealt with and to 
have them resolved in a way that avoided the need for court battles. Following from the 
                                                 
7 See B. Hoggett, ‘Joint Parenting Systems: The English Experiment’, (1994) 6 J of Child 
Law 8, 9; A. Diduck and F. Kaganas, Family Law, Gender and the State (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2006), p 281.  
8 Re L (Contact: Domestic Violence); Re V (Contact: Domestic Violence); Re M (Contact: 
Domestic Violence); Re H (Contact: Domestic Violence) [2000] 2 FLR 334 (CA), 364. 
9 See Re O (Contact: Imposition of Conditions) [1995] 2 FLR 124, 129-30: ‘Furthermore, 
neither parent should be allowed to think that ‘the more intransigent,… unreasonable,… 
obdurate… and.. unco-operative they are, the more likely they are to get their own way.’ See 
also Re P (Children) [2008] EWCA Civ 1431, [2009] 1 FLR 1056 [38]: [C]ontact should not 
be stopped unless it is the last resort for the judge’. 
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recommendations of the Finer Committee, alternative dispute resolution came to be seen as 
the best way of achieving this.    
 
3. Litigation as a Last Resort 
Disquiet about the role of the courts continues and has been articulated by both policymakers 
and the judiciary. For instance, the Ministerial Foreword to the Green Paper that preceded the 
Children and Adoption Act 2006 stated that ‘[t]he current way in which the courts intervene 
in disputed contact cases does not work well’.10 Amongst the judiciary, Wall LJ has been 
particularly outspoken on the matter and has described the court process as ‘stressful…, 
expensive, slow and adversarial.’  ‘It tends,’ he said, ‘to entrench parental attitudes rather than 
encouraging them to change. It is ill-adapted to dealing with the difficult human dilemmas 
involved, notably when it comes to the enforcement of its orders’.11 Similarly, Lord Justice 
Thorpe said, in Re L, that the family justice system has only limited capacity ‘to produce 
good outcomes in disputed areas of personal relationship’.12
 
 
                                                 
10 DCA, DfES and DTE, Parental Separation: Children’s Needs and Parents’ 
Responsibilities,  Cm 6273 (London: The Stationery Office, 2004), p1. See also, The 
Advisory Board on Family Law: Children Act Sub-Committee, Making Contact Work, A 
Report to the Lord Chancellor on The Facilitation of Arrangements for Contact Between 
Children and their Non-residential Parents and the Enforcement of Court Orders for Contact, 
(London: The Stationery Office, 2002), para 1.10; DCSF, Support for All, Cm 7787 (London: 
TSO, 2010), p9. 
11 Re O (Contact: Withdrawal of Application) [2003] EWHC 3031 (Fam), [2004] 1 FLR 1258 
[6(6)].  
12 Re L (Contact: Domestic Violence) p366 
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Because the courts were and are thought to be less than ideal for resolving contact disputes, 
they have been designated a ‘last resort’.13
 
 Insofar as the dispute, and more specifically, 
litigation of the dispute, has been regarded as the problem, agreement has been designated the 
solution. And insofar as agreement has been seen as evidence of co-operation, it has been seen 
as the solution to the problems of conflict and re-litigation. Alternative dispute resolution 
continues to be promoted as the most promising mechanism for achieving agreement. 
The now defunct divorce procedure embodied in the Family Law Act 1996 placed ADR at the 
centre of the divorce process. And although the main provisions of the statute will not come 
into force, the Labour government always maintained a commitment to promoting mediation 
and in-court conciliation.14
make family law arbitration binding in law’.
 At the time of writing, the coalition government has been in office 
only a week and what policies will emerge remains to be seen. However, the Centre for Social 
Justice which, while declaring itself non-partisan, appears to reflect the views of the 
Conservative end of the political spectrum, recommends ‘that ADR should be properly 
regarded as primary dispute resolution and that there should be primary legislation to 
15
 
 
                                                 
13 See, eg, The Advisory Board on Family Law, Making Contact Work, para 1.9.  
14 See eg See eg DCA, DfES and DTI, Parental Separation: Children’s Needs and Parents’ 
Responsibilities: Next Steps Cm 6452 (London, The Stationery Office, 2005) p11; DCSF, 
Support for All, paras 4.33-4.36 
15 The Family Law Review, Every Family Matters. An In-depth Review of Family Law in 
Britain. A Policy Report by the Family Law Review  (London, The Centre for Family Justice, 
2009) Executive Summary 25 (emphasis in original). The Centre is chaired by Iain Duncan 
Smith. 
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The emphasis on settlement has permeated the family justice system. Where cases do get to 
court, the aim of the lawyers, the judge and Cafcass is to get the parties to reach an agreement. 
Negotiation between solicitors, admonishment from the bench, in-court conciliation and 
reports by Cafcass are all deployed in the effort to make a final hearing avoidable.16 The new 
Practice Direction issued pursuant to the Revised Private Law Programme continues with this 
approach and stipulates that a Cafcass Family Court Advisor and where possible a mediator 
should attend the first hearing.17 The court, ‘in collaboration with the Cafcass Officer, and 
with the assistance of any mediator present, will seek to assist the parties in conciliation and 
in resolution of all or any of the issues between them’.18 The possibility of intervention by 
Cafcass, mediation by an external provider and collaborative law must also be considered.19
 
  
However, while ADR remains central to family policy and practice, it is no panacea. In its 
favour, there is evidence that ADR mechanisms are effective in some cases. Trinder and 
Kellett, for example, found that in-court conciliation seemed to result in contact for 
‘significantly more’ children and that children were having more contact than they had had 
previously.20
                                                 
16 J. Hunt and A. Macleod, Outcomes of Applications to Court for Contact Orders after 
Parental Separation or Divorce (London: Ministry of Justice, 2008), p168ff. 
 However, their research also revealed two problems. First, agreements reached 
17 Practice Direction. The Revised Private Law Programme, 26 March 2010,  para 4.1. 
18 Ibid. para 4.4. See also para 5.2(a). 
19 Ibid. para 5.2 (c) 
20 L. Trinder and J. Kellett, The Longer Term Outcomes of In-court Conciliation. Ministry of 
Justice Research Series 15/07 (London: Ministry of Justice, 2007) p 50. 
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in conciliation broke down; 40% of cases returned to court within two years.21 The second 
problem was that parents remained in conflict.22
 
   
This and other research indicates that, that in spite the spread of the settlement culture, the 
tide of litigation over contact has not been stemmed.23 It is true that most cases are settled and 
that, at about 10% of contact arrangements,24  the proportion of cases that reaches the courts 
is relatively small. Nevertheless these cases are numerically significant and it is reasonable to 
assume that these cases are among the most bitterly fought, involving high levels of conflict.25 
This means that the courts, despite doubts about their suitability or efficacy when it comes to 
conflict within families, are forced to deal with the most intractable disputes, for it is 
generally agreed that there is no other forum that can do so.26
 
  
In executing this task, the courts have predictably been subject to criticism.  In the past 10 
years or so, they have been criticised on two main fronts. First, women’s groups, domestic 
violence campaigners and some child welfare organisations have criticised the strong pro-
contact ethos that has dominated both ADR and judicial decision-making. They warned that 
the issue of domestic violence was not being addressed and that women and children were 
                                                 
21 Ibid,  p 50. Re-litigation rates might have been even higher, they observed, had parents not 
given up because they did not believe the court would help or because they were unable to 
bear the financial and emotional cost.  
22 Ibid. p 51.  
23 See eg R. Bailey-Harris, G. Davis, J. Barron & J. Pearce, Monitoring Private Law 
Applications under the Children Act 1989. Research Report to the Nuffield Foundation 
(Bristol: University of Bristol, 1998), p 16 
24 See A. Blackwell & F. Dawe, Non-Resident Parental Contact. Final Report. (London: 
Office for National Statistics, 2003). See also Hunt and Macleod, Outcomes, p 92. 
25 See Hunt and Macleod, Outcomes, p 3 and references cited there. 
26 See below. 
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being left vulnerable to abuse in the rush to promote contact. Secondly, there were, and there 
continue to be, vociferous complaints from fathers’ rights groups claiming that contact 
agreements and orders are being disobeyed, and are being disobeyed with impunity, by 
unreasonable mothers. These complaints have been well-publicised by the media. And it has 
been said that the failure to bring recalcitrant mothers into line must be undermining public 
confidence in the family justice system. 
 
In order to maintain credibility, the courts have to try to meet the public’s expectations of 
them and be seen to respond. In the light of the opposing pressures that the court system has 
been facing, it has sought to implement the mantra now repeated in policy documents: contact 
should be the aim ‘as long as it is safe’.27 So now, alongside the emphasis on promoting 
contact and settlement, attention is also being paid to safety by means of measures such as 
risk assessments,28 fact-finding hearings29 and judicial scrutiny of consent orders30 as well as 
the use of indirect or supervised contact.31
                                                 
27 See e.g. DCA, DfES and DTI, Parental Separation: Children’s Needs and Parents’ 
Responsibilities: Next Steps, p5. 
 In practice, however, it appears still to be the case 
that contact is regarded as being almost invariably in children’s best interests; unless it can be 
28 Primarily relating to the safety of the child. See e.g. Practice Direction, The Revised Private 
Law Programme, para 3.9; The President’s Renewed Interim Guidance for England, 1 April 
2010 para 16. 
29 See  Practice Direction; Residence and Contact Orders: Domestic Violence and Harm, 
[2009] 1 FCR 223, paras 21-23.  
30 See Practice Direction, The Revised Private Law Programme, paras 1.3, 5.3. 
31 See  Practice Direction; Residence and Contact Orders: Domestic Violence and Harm, 
paras 26-29. 
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established that the non-resident parent (usually the father) poses a significant risk,32
 
 contact 
will be ordered and, increasingly, enforced.  
4. The Importance of Contact 
The ‘good’ post-separation family is portrayed as one that eschews conflict and ensures that 
children’s relationships with both parents are preserved.33 This vision is embraced by 
policymakers, legislators, the courts, legal professionals and Cafcass officers.34 So entrenched 
is the conviction that contact is important for children that it appears that the courts treat the 
absence of contact as presenting the greatest risks to children’s well-being resulting from 
parental separation or divorce.35 Except in cases of serious violence or abuse, there appears to 
be little or no acknowledgement in either political or legal discourse of research that does not 
support the assumption that contact is ‘necessarily “good” and that children are damaged if it 
is not sustained’.36
                                                 
32 See, for example, Re D (Contact: Reasons for Refusal) [1997] 2 FLR 48 (CA); Re M 
(Contact: Violent Parent) [1999] 2 FLR 321 (FD); Re L (Contact: Domestic Violence); Re F 
(Contact) [2007] EWHC 2543 (Fam); [2008] 1 FLR 1163. In Re W (Permission to Appeal) 
([2007] EWCA Civ 786, [2008] 1 FLR 406), Wall LJ, setting out to refute claims that the 
family justice system dispenses injustice, identified the problem as being unreasonable and 
indeed ‘bad’ fathers rather than the courts. See also Re Bradford; Re O’Connell [2006] 
EWCA Civ 1199; [2007] 1 FLR 530. Compare, for example, Re J-S (a child) (contact: 
parental responsibility) [2002] EWCA Civ 1028; [2002] 3 FCR 433.  
  
33 Diduck & Kaganas,  Family Law, Gender and the State, p 316. 
34 It was also endorsed by the Labour government. The new government may well do so even 
more emphatically. See The Family Law Review Every Family Matters, ch 5 
35 F. Kaganas ‘Contact, Conflict and Risk’ in S. Day Sclater and C. Piper (eds.),  
Undercurrents of Divorce (Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing Company Limited, 1999). 
36 Diduck & Kaganas, Family Law, Gender and the State, p 318. See, for an account of such 
research findings, J. Pryor and B. Rodgers, Children in Changing Families: Life after 
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Why so much importance is attached to contact has been extensively canvassed elsewhere. 
The explanations have included a combination of the influence of fathers’ rights groups which 
deploy equality arguments; the new right seeking to maintain the semblance of the nuclear 
family despite parental separation;37 and research findings indicating that children benefit 
from contact.38 While the influence of the new right has waned,39
 
 equality and welfare 
arguments retain considerable force. In particular, the authority of child welfare ‘science’ 
renders it an unassailable ‘truth’ that contact is almost always good for children. 
In fact, child welfare knowledge is far more nuanced than policymakers and the legal system 
allow; the findings relied on tend to be rather more qualified than the way in which they are 
portrayed and, indeed, research findings of some studies are contradicted by others. That 
within law and politics contact has come to be seen as almost invariably beneficial despite 
evidence to the contrary may be explained by the propensity of social systems for selective 
interpretation and oversimplification of social science and child welfare research. King and 
                                                                                                                                                        
Parental Separation (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001). See also J. Walker, McCarthy, C. Stark and 
K, Laing,  Picking up the Pieces: Marriage and Divorce: Two Years After Information 
Provision (London: Department of Constitutional Affairs, 2004) p314. See also Kaganas 
‘Contact, Conflict and Risk’,  pp107-8 and the studies referred to there. 
37 See C. Smart, ‘Power and the Politics of Child Custody’ in C. Smart and S. Sevenhuijsen 
(eds.), Child Custody and the Politics of Gender (London: Routledge, 1989) 
38 See e.g. J. Wallerstein and J. Kelly, Surviving the Breakup: How Children and Parents 
Cope with Divorce (New York: Basic Books, 1980).  
39 Although the emphasis on marriage and the nuclear family is re-emerging in conservative 
thinking. See Family Law Review, Every Family Matters.  
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Piper40 argue that because law41
 
 is an autopoetic system, there are difficulties inherent in 
translating child welfare discourse into legal discourse. They assert that the way the law 
‘thinks’ about children is different from the way that child welfare science does.  
Law as a system of communication has nothing to say about what is good or bad for children. 
For that assessment the law has to look to child welfare knowledge. Yet in order to fulfil its 
function as a system for making decisions, for making findings about right and wrong, the law 
has to reconstruct child welfare knowledge in terms that ‘make sense’ to it. This leads to 
reductionism as law cannot accommodate the complexities and the uncertainties of the 
available research. Law reinterprets and simplifies child welfare knowledge and also makes 
choices from available principles. Rather than choosing the path of abandoning contact where 
it is fraught and difficult, as was often the case in the past, the law has in more recent years set 
itself the task of removing the obstacles to contact.42
 
 In most cases, it is recalcitrant mothers 
who are seen as the main obstacles; resident parents (usually mothers) who oppose or frustrate 
contact are seen as jeopardising their children’s well-being. And the legal system has, it 
seems, redoubled it efforts in response to the lobbying of fathers’ rights groups and their 
ability to give very public expression to their grievances.  
5. Resident Parents and Contact - encouraged, persuaded, pushed or forced? 
                                                 
40 M. King and C. Piper, How the Law Thinks About Children (Aldershot: Arena, 1995), p50. 
41 The same would apply to politics. 
42 The change from earlier interpretations of child welfare knowledge is striking. The Law 
Commission in 1986 acknowledged the contradictions in the available research. However it 
thought that the security of the child’s environment and the security of  the resident parent 
should take priority over the maintenance of beneficial links with the non-resident parent (The 
Law Commission, Working Paper no 96 Family Law: Review of Child Law: 
Custody,(London: HMSO, 1986)  para 3.7-3.8; para 4.21)  
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It appears to have been the complaints of fathers’ rights groups that led to the commissioning 
of a research study by Hunt and Macleod.43 This research was undertaken as a result of a 
commitment by the Labour Government to Parliament to establish an evidence base in the 
light of anecdotal accounts that fathers were being unfairly treated.44 Using a sample of cases 
initiated in 2004, it set out to examine decision-making in contact cases in the context of 
‘claims that non-resident parents do not get a fair deal from the family courts in that they may 
get little or no contact for no good reason’.45 The researchers concluded that only a small 
proportion of non-resident parents (10%) might be seen as getting a ‘poor deal’, but that this 
tended only to relate to quantum of contact. In addition unfairness to a parent did not mean 
unfairness to the child; often it was the child’s objections that led to the decision.46 Also, the 
non-resident parent’s refusal to co-operate with the court process was a common reason for 
the outcome.47
 
 
Hunt and Macleod found no evidence of court bias against fathers.48 On the contrary, they 
found that ‘the court starts from the position that contact is generally regarded as being in the 
interests of children and unless there are very good reasons to the contrary, is likely to be 
ordered at the end of the day’.49
                                                 
43 Hunt & Macleod, Outcomes.  
 Often, in cases of maternal resistance, enforcement 
44 Ibid. p3. 
45 Ibid. p239. 
46 Ibid. p246 
47 Ibid. p 247 
48 Ibid. p253 
49 Ibid. p251. 
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proceedings appear to have led to renewed contact and this was attributed by the researchers, 
in some cases, to threats of a penal notice50 or a transfer of residence.51
 
  
The research reveals that persuasion and coercion appeared to be used even in cases where 
mothers’ refusal to co-operate stemmed from justifiable fears. The authors record that serious 
welfare concerns, such as substance abuse, mental illness, child abuse and domestic violence 
were raised in nearly two thirds of the cases analysed. Almost half of all the cases involved 
allegations of domestic violence and in some instances the resident parent raised multiple 
welfare issues.52 In most of the cases involving allegations of domestic violence, these were 
admitted, proved or supported by evidence.53 Nevertheless 70% of the cases in the sample 
ended with a contact order.54 Most dispositions were for face to face contact and half of those 
allowed staying contact. While some applications were withdrawn, in only one case out of 
286 was there an order for no contact.55 Of the cases where at least one serious welfare 
concern was raised, 60% ended with staying or unsupervised visiting contact.56 Neither 
domestic violence57 nor the objections of children, especially if young, were necessarily 
considered an impediment to contact.58
                                                 
50 Although courts were reluctant to impose a penal notice. See Hunt & Macleod, Outcomes, 
p138, 195-6. 
 The courts were seen to ‘bend over backwards to try 
51 Hunt & Macleod Outcomes, p 148ff; p195. Threats might be made by solicitors (p 143), the 
courts or by Cafcass (p175). 
52 Ibid. p 9. 
53 Ibid. p 84. 
54 Ibid. pp 11 -12. 
55 Ibid. p13. See also p 55. 
56 Ibid. p16 
57 See Hunt & Macleod, Outcomes, p 185. 
58 Hunt & Macleod, Outcomes, p19. See, on the courts’ persistence in seeking to overcome 
the objections of a child, pp 199-210. 
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and assist and accommodate fathers’ even if violent.59 Some Cafcass officers thought that 
there were courts that went too far; they said that judges were failing to take mothers’ 
concerns seriously: ‘When the courts get stroppy with mothers who won’t allow contact I 
sometimes think they don’t stop enough and say well actually they might have a damn good 
reason for it’.60 The courts’ persistence had the potential to expose children to conflict and to 
jeopardize their welfare and their relationships with their resident parents. Courts could be 
characterised as ‘contact at all costs’:61
 
 
The no stone unturned as an approach of the court is something we are 
pulled up against again and again. ‘Are you sure you have done everything? 
                                                 
59 Solicitor interviewed by Hunt and Macleod, Outcomes. See for the comments of 
professionals p 190-191. See also Kaganas, ‘Conflict, Contact and Risk’. 
60 Cafcass Officer, Hunt and Macleod, Outcomes, p 191. 
61 Hunt and Macleod, Outcomes, p191. The courts see themselves as following the advice 
proffered in welfare reports (Sir Mark Potter, then President of the Family Division, acting as 
chair, Current Legal Problems lecture 29 October 2009). However, it may be that 
professionals tailor their practice to take into account what advice or evidence the courts will 
find acceptable. Anderson found this to be the case in relation to solicitors (see L. Anderson, 
Contact Between Children and Violent Fathers: In Whose Best Interests? (London: Rights of 
Women, 1997) p16). James et al comment, in relation to representation of children’s views, 
that CFRs construct their reports to conform to legal constraints and that they ‘may find it 
difficult …to reason outside the logic of this conceptual system. Consequently, it becomes 
extremely difficult for them to argue in the case of any individual child for the differences 
their particular circumstances may make to the determination of what is in the child's best 
interests’ (A. L. James, A. James and S McNamee, ‘Research — Turn Down The Volume? — 
Not Hearing Children In Family Proceedings’ [2004] 16 CFLQ 189, 200. 
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Are you sure you couldn’t just observe or supervise a couple of contacts and 
that would unlock the situation’.62
 
 
The study shows that a high proportion of cases were resolved by means of consent orders.63 
However the extent to which some of the consent orders reflected genuine agreement must be 
open to question. Resident parents were put under considerable pressure throughout the legal 
process. Solicitors worked to get the parties to agree to contact.64 Judges used their authority 
to impress on resident parents, even at the first appointment, that contact would be in the 
interests of the child.65 They sought to persuade the resident mother that allowing contact 
would be ‘the right thing to do’; [Y]ou’re cajoling, you’re persuading, sometimes you think 
you’re more like a social worker than a judge’66 One of the judges interviewed said67
 
: 
I think we have a number of cases where a mother will come back to court 
and say, there’s been a consent order, she’s not abided by it and she’s come 
back and say she was forced into agreeing it, whether it’s by her lawyers, or she feels she was 
forced by the court to agree. Yes, that does happen. 
 
Resident parents who resisted would be subjected to renewed efforts to persuade them.  Hunt 
and Macleod describe cases demonstrating considerable reluctance on the part of the courts 
                                                 
62 Cafcass officer, Hunt & Macleod, Outcomes, p 190. 
63 At least 85% of the orders made were by consent (Hunt & Macleod, Outcomes,  p 12) 
64 Hunt & Macleod, Outcomes, pp 94, 171, 175. 
65 Ibid. p 95. 
66 Ibid. p 194.  
67 Hunt & Macleod, Outcomes, p 175. 
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and the professionals to concede that the goal of securing contact might not be achievable in 
some cases:68
 
 
[T]he process of reaching “agreement” was often slow and fraught with difficulty as resident 
parents were encouraged, persuaded, pushed or forced into shifting their position. The impetus 
throughout from the court and Cafcass officers was to try to move contact on, sometimes in 
very inauspicious circumstances, and while the preferred approach was typically conciliatory a 
harsher line was sometimes evident when this failed to bring about the desired response.69
 
 
Given the pressure to which resident mothers were subjected, and the circumstances in which 
contact was ordered, it might be questioned whether the orders made were always appropriate. 
Indeed Hunt and Macleod’s findings suggest they sometimes were not; there were cases70
 
  in 
which the court declined to enforce orders in the context of serious welfare concerns or 
resistance from the children.  
The findings reported by Hunt and Macleod are consistent with earlier academic work 
suggesting that the assumption that children need contact frequently overshadows other 
considerations that affect children’s welfare as well as that of mothers.71
                                                 
68 Ibid. p165. See, for the description of the cases,  pp160ff. 
 It confirms that in 
many contested cases, the source of the conflict, and what appears to motivate resident 
69 Ibid. p120. 
70 Ibid. pp 71ff; pp 85-88. See also H. Rhoades, ‘'The "No-Contact Mother": Reconstructions 
of Motherhood in the Era of the "New Father"' (2002) 16 International Journal of Law Policy 
and the Family, 71.  
71 See, for example, C. Smart and B. Neale, ‘Arguments Against Virtue – Must Contact be 
Enforced?’ (1997) Fam Law 332;  C. Smart,  ‘ The Legal and Moral Ordering of Child 
Custody’ (1991) 18 J of Law and Society 485 ; Kaganas, ‘Contact, Conflict and Risk’;  
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mothers’ opposition to contact, are concerns about the non-resident parent’s behaviour or 
parenting capacity.72
 
 However, these concerns are often subordinated by professionals and 
judges involved in dealing with contact disputes to an apparently overriding imperative of 
maintaining contact. The problem is seen as residing in the mother and the solution is taken to 
lie in getting mothers to accede to contact. 
Hunt and Macleod’s study ended in 2006 but there is nothing to suggest that the prioritization 
of contact has changed or that the courts have become more circumspect in making orders.73
                                                 
72 See Rhoades, ‘'The "No-Contact Mother"’ 71; S. Day Sclater and F. Kaganas ‘Contact: 
Mothers Welfare and Rights’ in A. Bainham, B. Lindley, M. Richards and L. Trinder (eds.), 
Children and Their Families (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2003); F. Kaganas and S. Day Sclater, 
‘Contact Disputes: Narrative Constructions of “Good” Parents’ (2004) 12 Feminist Legal 
Studies 1. 
 
Admittedly there is now a requirement that courts scrutinize agreements before making 
consent orders. However in the light of the prevailing pro-contact ethos it cannot be certain 
that this will make contact safer or more sustainable in many cases. Mothers may even be 
deterred from voicing their fears or objections in the face of threats of imprisonment or 
73 A recent investigation conducted for the Sunday Times Magazine indicates that courts 
continue to ignore mothers’ concerns: C. Toomey ‘Mothers’ Ruin’, The Sunday Times 
Magazine 2 August 2009 p 48, 53. There is as yet no available evidence on the working of the 
Revised Private Law Programme. This is supposed to evidence ‘growing recognition of the 
impact of domestic violence and abuse, drug and alcohol misuse and mental illness’ (Practice 
Direction. The Revised Private Law Programme, para 1.3; Revised  Private Law Programme 
p1). The PLP requires Cafacass to undertake risk assessments in terms of s16A of the 
Children Act where the FCA suspects that a child is at risk of harm (Practice Direction. The 
Revised Private Law Programme, para 1.3;  Revised  Private Law Programme pp1and 5) and 
the court must scrutinise agreements before making consent orders (Practice Direction. The 
Revised Private Law Programme, para 1.3;  Revised  Private Law Programme p 8). 
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removal of their children.74
 
 And there appears to be a greater willingness on the part of the 
professionals and the courts to resort to such threats. Courts in particular are concerned not to 
be seen as allowing mothers to disobey orders. 
6. Restoring Public Confidence in the Courts: Dealing with ‘Problem’ Mothers 
One of the main problems complained of by fathers’ rights groups is that contact 
arrangements are not adhered to and that courts cannot ensure compliance. That the courts 
have a limited impact on outcomes is confirmed by research conducted by Trinder and Kellet; 
they found that the amount of court intervention did not determine the amount of contact 
taking place in the cases they examined.75 Both resident and non-resident parents in their 
sample complained that court orders were not being obeyed. Non-resident parents said this 
was because resident parents were blocking contact or influencing their children against it. 
Resident parents maintained that non-resident parents were not sticking to dates and times.76
 
  
It is, however, largely non-compliant resident mothers rather than unreliable fathers who have 
attracted the courts’ attention. Mothers who oppose contact have been described as 
‘implacably hostile’ and they are often urged to change their ways.77
                                                 
74 Toomey’s article (‘Mothers’ Ruin) quotes Mavis Maclean of the Oxford Centre for Family 
Law and Policy (Oxflap) as saying that mothers are often afraid to voice their anxieties for 
fear of being viewed as obstructive and of being deprived of residence as a result. 
 In addition, mothers who 
express serious concerns such as fear of violence appear to be regarded as potentially 
75 Trinder & J Kellett, The Longer Term Outcomes, p 20 
76 Ibid. 43 
77 See, for example, Re D (A Minor) (Contact: Mother’s Hostility) [1993] 2 FLR 1 (CA) 7-8. 
The obstacle to successful contact is often identified as an obstructive mother. See the 
professionals’ and judicial officers’ views quoted in Hunt & Macleod, Outcomes, p193.  
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manipulative and so suspect. 78 The reported cases reflect an assumption that, unless a 
significant level of violence, or perhaps some other serious paternal deficiency is proved, it is 
obstructive mothers who are the problem79  requiring a solution. That solution is seen to lie in 
more effective measures to bring such mothers into line.80
 
  
While castigation of resident mothers is not new, and while the courts are still reluctant to 
enforce orders by transferring residence or by imprisoning mothers for contempt of court,81
                                                 
78 See, for a recent example SS v KS [2009] EWHC 1575 (Fam) where supervised interim 
contact was confirmed on appeal despite serious allegations, a past criminal conviction and an 
acknowledged risk of emotional abuse of mother and child. The court here stressed that 
findings of fact need only be held where the truth of the allegations would have a significant 
impact on the type of order to be made. The court also referred to the risk of false or 
exaggerated allegations. While it appears therefore that the number of fact-finding hearings 
has increased significantly, the protection afforded to mothers and children may not have. 
 
they have begun to act more punitively. This response, it seems, may be attributed to a large 
extent to the activities of fathers’ rights organisations, or, more specifically, those of 
Fathers4Justice, which received widespread media coverage. The judiciary appears to have 
79 Re L (Contact: Domestic Violence) 351. 
80 See also Hunt & Macleod, Outcomes, p197. 
81 See e.g. The Advisory Board on Family Law: Children Act Sub-Committee, Making 
Contact Work. A Report to the Lord-Chancellor on the Facilitation of Arrangements for 
Contact Between Children and their Non-residential Parents and the Enforcement of Court 
Orders for Contact (London: The Stationery Office)  para 14.10.  
14.10. But see A v N (Committal: Refusal of Contact) [1997] 1 FLR 533 (CA); F v F 
(Contact: Committal) [1998] 2 FLR 237 (CA). In B v S (Contempt: Imprisonment of Mother) 
[2009] EWCA Civ 548, [2009] 2 FLR 1005, Wilson, LJ, dismissing an appeal against a 
sentence of imprisonment said: The days are long gone when mothers can assume that their 
role as carers of children protects them from being sentenced to immediate terms of 
imprisonment for clear, repeated and deliberate breaches of contact orders’ (para 16). He 
advised the mother not only to refrain from obstructing contact but to promote it (para 16). 
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been concerned about the possibility of a loss of public confidence in the family justice 
system. They accordingly set out to rebut allegations that courts let mothers ‘get away with’ 
flouting orders.   
 
In Re C (Residence Order)82
 
 for example, the court found that the harm the child was 
suffering or would suffer if residence were not transferred to the father outweighed the harm 
she would suffer by being removed from the mother. The court referred to the protests of 
fathers in many cases coming before it that ‘the court is powerless to enforce its orders, quite 
unable to control the intractable, implacably hostile mother’. It seemed to regard its decision 
in part as evidence to such fathers that the courts are not powerless:  
Time after time this court has to mollify the angry father, endeavouring to explain that the 
judge has a broad discretion and that his decision cannot be challenged unless plainly wrong. 
This time the boot is on the other foot, and if a different conclusion has been reached in this 
case then let it be shouted out from the rooftops. 
 
In V v V (Contact: Implacable Hostility)83 the court also transferred residence to the father. 
This transfer was effected despite the fact that the children wanted to stay with their mother, 
that the move would cause them ‘emotional upheaval’ and that the mother had, apart from the 
children’s relationship with the father, ‘more than adequately’ met their needs.84
                                                 
82 [2007] EWCA Civ 866; [2008] 1 FLR 211 [24]. See also Re M (Intractable Contact 
Dispute: Interim Care Order [2003] EWHC Fam 1024; [2003] 2 FLR 636 for a case where 
residence was transferred. 
 However, 
83 [2004] EWHC Fam 1215; [2004] 2 FLR 851. 
84 Ibid.  [45]-[46]. 
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what is most notable about this case is the judge’s call for law reform. Bracewell J, clearly 
mindful of the publicity attracted by Fathers4Justice at the time said: 
 
[4] There is a perception among part of the media, and some members of the parents’ groups, 
as well as members of the public, that the courts rubber-stamp cases awarding care of children 
to mothers almost automatically and marginalise fathers from the lives of their children. There 
is also a perception that courts allow parents with care to flout court orders for contact and 
permit parents with residence to exclude the parent from the lives of the children so that the 
other parent is worn down by years of futile litigation which achieves nothing and only ends 
when that parent gives up the struggle, or the children are old enough to make their own 
decisions, assuming they have not been brainwashed in the meantime…. 
 
[6] ….Unreasonable parents, by definition, are difficult to deal with, and the most intractable 
situation is undoubtedly the unreasonable mother, but judges currently do not have the tools 
with which to make progress with the unreasonable mother or sometimes the unreasonable 
father who can flout or frustrate orders with impunity unless sent to prison. 
 
The judge declared that changes were needed. For example, Cafcass should monitor contact 
arrangements and bring cases back to court if necessary. Legislation was needed to give 
courts the ‘weapons’ they needed to deal with a ‘small group of obdurate mothers’.85
                                                 
85 Ibid. [10]. 
  They 
should be able to refer parents to counselling, parenting programmes and classes. They should 
be able to make referrals to psychiatrists or psychologists. They should be able to order 
community service. For courts to ‘give up’ in the sense of making an order for indirect contact 
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or no order at all was unacceptable: ‘This option results in a perception fostered by the press 
that family courts are failing in private law cases and that family judges are anti-father.’86
 
  
Similar calls for reform had previously been made by Munby J in Re D (Intractable Contact 
Dispute: Publicity).87 He too referred to media coverage and the ‘risk [of] forfeiting public 
confidence’. ‘We ignore the media at our peril’, 88  he warned and went on to advocate ‘swift, 
efficient enforcement of existing court orders’.89
 
  
Media reports of the type referred to by Munby J have prompted the courts, in a bid to defend 
themselves against claims of bias,90  unfairness and secrecy, 91  to direct some of their fire at a 
different problem: irresponsible or dangerous fathers. However, while judges are ready to 
point out the shortcomings of some fathers in order to correct misconceptions about the 
probity of the family justice system, the legal system has, in the main, focused on showing 
that it is willing to punish ‘bad’ mothers.92
                                                 
86 Ibid. 10]. 
 The calls for ‘better’ enforcement measures were 
not directed at getting unreliable or indifferent fathers to visit and take responsibility for their 
children. The request for more powers was primarily motivated by a wish to control mothers 
87 [2004] EWHC Fam 727; [2004] 1 FLR 1226. 
88 Para 4. 
89 Para 56. 
90 See, for example, Re O (Contact: Withdrawal of Application) [2003] EWHC 3031 (Fam), 
[2004] 1 FLR 1258 at 1260; Re M (Intractable Contact Dispute: Interim Care Order) [2003] 
EWHC Fam 1024; [2003] 2 FLR 636 para 23; Re W (Permission to Appeal) [2007] EWCA 
Civ 786, [2008] 1 FLR 406; Re Bradford; Re O’Connell [2006] EWCA Civ 1199; [2007] 1 
FLR 530 para 97. 
91 The Family Courts have now been opened up to the media. 
92 See also S. Adams, ‘Parents’ Rights v Children’s Needs in Private Cases’ [2007] Fam Law 
257, 261. 
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and, in doing so, to restore public confidence in the ability of courts to ensure that their orders 
would be complied with. These judicial demands reflect a newly emerging belief that the 
courts can be effective in ‘making contact work’93
 
 provided that they play a different role 
from their traditional one and provided this role is facilitated by different powers.  
7. A Therapeutic approach – ‘outcomes that are sustainable, that are in the best 
interests of children’ 
That ultimately it is the court that has to make contact work is not in doubt as far as 
policymakers are concerned.  It is agreed that courts are still the arena in which contact cases, 
and in particular the most intractable ones, should be decided. Making Contact Work94
 
 states: 
1.8 There will, of course, always be a role for the court to play in making contact work. The 
court remains the one institution which has both the authority to define and the power to 
impose a solution which is in the interests of the child. 
 
The pressing question, however, has become how to ensure that the solution is an enduring 
one. It is not enough that the court makes a determination; what matters is that resident 
parents comply with the order.  
 
                                                 
93 The notion of making contact work was central to the Labour government’s policy on 
contact. See eg The Advisory Board on Family Law: Children Act Sub-Committee, Making 
Contact Work.  
94 The Advisory Board on Family Law: Children Act Sub-Committee, Making Contact Work.  
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It is still the case that the courts remain a last resort and the preference is still for agreement. 
In a Practice Direction issued by the President of the Family Division, the aim is stated as 
follows: 
 
1.7 The Revised Programme is designed to assist parties to reach safe agreements where 
possible, to provide a forum in which to find the best way to resolve issues in each individual 
case and to promote outcomes that are sustainable, that are in the best interests of children and 
that take account of their perspectives.95
 
 
What is new here is a concern not only with consensus and compliance but with sustainable 
outcomes. Where conflict persists and non-compliance is a problem, it is the court that has to 
be the final arbiter. It is therefore imperative that the courts maintain their authority and so 
retain public confidence in their ability to dispense justice. Making Contact Work alludes to 
this: 
 
14.47 We agree with the majority view that where a contact dispute is part of a court process 
and results in a court order, the court needs to retain its powers to compel obedience to its 
orders, and that fines and imprisonment are part of that process.  
 
Nevertheless, these measures are considered inappropriate in most cases.96
                                                 
95 Practice Direction. The Revised Private Law Programme, This recapitulates The President’s 
Guidance. The Revised Private Law Programme (2009), Introduction. 
 Making Contact 
Work acknowledges that they ‘are not only crude methods of enforcement; they are wholly 
inadequate as a means of addressing the problem of contact orders which have not been 
96 The Advisory Board on Family Law: Children Act Sub-Committee, Making Contact Work, 
para 14.47. 
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implemented’.97 Different, more ‘effective’ powers, on the other hand, could facilitate 
acceptable long-term outcomes. The authors of Making Contact Work98 thought that the more 
punitive the measure, the less likely it would be to succeed and that success might lie in court 
ordered parent education and a more ‘therapeutic’ approach to help parents to ‘work though 
difficulties, hostilities etc’.99
 
  
It is not only policy-makers who have held these views. The courts themselves have not 
seriously challenged the legitimacy of the expectation that they should act as a key resource 
for making contact ‘work’.100 That contact problems might be insoluble where parents are 
deeply conflicted is something that neither those working in the legal system101 nor 
government have been willing contemplate. That the family justice system might be of little 
use in resolving matters satisfactorily or at all is something that, ultimately, cannot be 
conceded;102
 
 to do so would surely damage public confidence in it irrevocably. What might be 
seen as a fundamental mismatch between what courts can do and what makes contact ‘work’ 
has instead been characterised as a problem with a solution.  
                                                 
97 Ibid. para 14.48 
98 Citing Walker et al, Picking up the Pieces. 
99 Ibid. para 14.22. There are also concerns about violence; contact needs to be safe and of 
‘good quality’, according to the Children in Families Committee (cited by the Rt Hon Lord 
Justice Wall ‘Making Contact Work in 2009’ [2009] Fam Law 590, 594.  
100 Even Thorpe LJ in Re L (Contact: Domestic Violence) (see below) accepted that it would 
be unrealistic to expect otherwise. 
101 Solicitors interviewed by Hunt and Macleod also felt that ‘something’ had to be done to 
improve enforcement (Outcomes, p 208). 
102 But see Thorpe LJ in Re L (Contact: Domestic Violence), who comes close to this point. 
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The solutions adopted, education and therapeutic intervention,103 while consistent with the 
aim of ‘persuading’ parents to obey orders,104 are consistent also with the perception that it is 
the underlying conflict that makes contact fail and with the recent observation that, even if 
contact is happening, it is not necessarily ‘working: ‘Ongoing parental conflict, particularly 
surrounding the child, and actual, or alleged, parenting deficits are likely to be make contact a 
very fraught and difficult experience for children and is damaging to children’s wellbeing’.105 
Reporting on their recent research, Trinder and Kellett warn that what matters for children is 
not how much contact they have but that they have ‘good’ contact. 106
 
 
One attempt at persuasion in the form of education took the form of the Family Resolution 
Pilot Project. The scheme incorporated an initial risk assessment at court, parent education 
groups led by Relate and parent planning meetings with Cafcass officers.107 The project was 
not adjudged a success108
                                                 
103 Court orders themselves might be regarded as serving a therapeutic function: H. Reece, 
‘Parental Responsibility as Therapy’ [2009] Fam Law 1167. 
 but the researchers evaluating it found that the group sessions where 
104 The Advisory Board on Family Law: Children Act Sub-Committee, Making Contact Work, 
para 14.22. 
105 Trinder & Kellett, The Longer Term Outcomes, p 51. 
106 Ibid. p 51. 
107 L. Trinder, J. Kellett, J. Connolly and C. Notley, Evaluation of the Family Resolutions 
Pilot Project, Research Report 720, Executive Summary (London: DfES Publications. 2006) 
p 4. 
108 FAIns and the Family Resolution Pilot Project which were intended to promote a more 
holistic, educational and agreement orientated approach have not been deemed successful. See 
Trinder et al, Evaluation;  J Walker, P McCarthy, S Finch, M Coombes, M Richards and C 
Bridge with  K Laing, A Melville, S Kitchen, N Wood, S Raybould, C Wren, S Day- Sclater 
and P Webber, The Family Advice and Information Service: A Changing Role for Family 
Lawyers in England and Wales? Final Evaluation Report  (Newcastle: Newcastle Centre for 
Family Studies, 2007). 
 27 
education and information were imparted had some positive effects. Some parents reported 
that they had learned about the impact of separation on children and what would be best for 
the family.109 Parental relationships improved and there was some rethinking of attitudes.110 
However there was no evidence that this would lead to a change in behaviour or improved 
communication. Nor was there evidence that the limited benefits reported extended to high 
conflict cases.111
 
 The researchers evaluating the project recommended that special provision 
be made for the most conflicted parents: 
The family justice system should develop a range of parenting interventions including basic 
parent education and higher conflict education/therapeutic interventions to work alongside 
processes for dispute resolution and child involvement 112
 
 
Similarly, Trinder and Kellett state that ‘good’ contact requires parental co-operation and that 
interventions should therefore be directed at effecting ‘attitudinal and behavioural change’.113
                                                 
109 Trinder et al Evaluation p57. 
 
They found that, ‘Agreements and court orders alone are likely to increase significantly the 
chances of contact occurring but are far less likely to shift parental attitudes and 
110 Ibid.  p57-8. 
111 Ibid. p 78, 80 
112 Ibid.  p102 
113 Trinder & Kellett, The Longer Term Outcomes, 51. 
 28 
behaviour.’114 Therapeutic services, they thought, rather than conciliation or mediation can 
address the problems posed by ‘parental attitudes and the parental alliance’.115
 
  
So, the demand now is for a solution to a different problem. In the past, the problem was 
conceived of as a defective, conflict-promoting divorce process centred on fault-based 
grounds.116 The solution was to change the divorce law. More recently the problem was 
characterised as the lack of varied and broad powers of enforcement. The solution identified 
was to increase those powers. And the solution for the problem of obdurate resident parents 
has been thought to be to vest the court not only with the power to punish disobedience but 
also to send parents for interventions designed to change their minds and attitudes. The issues 
are no longer simply the objective absence of contact or the resort to litigation. Now it is the 
underlying cause of contact difficulties that is perceived as the problem: the relationship 
between the family members and the impact it has on their behaviour. What is needed is not 
only compliance with orders but also ‘good’ conflict-free contact. This can be achieved only 
if the parents’ relationship problems are addressed, whether therapeutically by means of 
counselling, or by educating parents. The aim of the Labour government, therefore, was to 
discover ‘how to shift the attitudes of some parents better to focus on the needs of the child 
and how to develop advice, information, mediation, conciliation and enforcement processes 
that are much better at doing so’.117
                                                 
114 Ibid. 51. See also Hunt & Macleod who observe that pressure to agree from solicitors 
might lead resident parents to shift their position but not their attitude (Outcomes, p 94). See 
also Hunt & Macleod p 147. 
 The assumption was and remains that even if contact is 
115 Trinder and Kellett, The Longer Term Outcomes, 52. See also B Cantwell  ‘In Practice: 
The Emotional Safeguarding of Children in private Law’ [2010] Fam Law 84. 
116 See Cretney,  Family Law in the Twentieth Century, p 386ff 
117 DCA, DfES and DTI, Parental Separation: Children’s Needs and Parents’ 
Responsibilities. Next Steps,  para 14. education and information are also central to the 
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not working well (or at all), intervention can make it work (or make it work better). And it 
appears that the family justice system is considered to have a part to play in this process.  
 
8. Outcome Focused Courts 
It is not envisaged that the courts should be directly involved in seeking to change attitudes.118 
Objections to their crossing well-established boundaries in this way today are much the same 
as they were nearly a century ago when the possibility was raised. Cretney119
 
 records the 
reform efforts in the late 1920s and early 1930s of Claude Mullins, a Metropolitan Police 
Magistrate, which, he says:  
raised important questions about the proper role of the legal system – in particular, about the 
relationship between, on the one hand, the court’s basic role in adjudicating on disputes in 
accordance with established legal norms, and, on the other, the extent and nature of their 
                                                                                                                                                        
recommendations of the Family Law Review, Every Family Matters.  Resort to parent 
education has been made elsewhere too. In Australia, parents are put into a Child Responsive 
Program before the case reaches the court. This program entails each parent watching a parent 
education DVD and then discussing their concerns and plans for child care with a Family 
Consultant, who is a social science specialist. Parents reported high levels of satisfaction with 
the Child Responsive Program and reported improved co-operation and a reduction in minor 
conflict. (J McIntosh and C Long (2007) The Child Responsive Program, operating within the 
Less Adversarial Trial: A Follow Up Study of Parent and Child Outcomes. Report to the 
Family Court of Australia, Victoria: Family Transitions). However, there is no indication in 
the research assessing the program as to the proportion of these parents whose relationships 
could be characterised as high conflict. Moreover the effect on children, especially those in 
shared care arrangements, was not necessarily beneficial. 
118  See e.g. Trinder & Kellett, The Longer Term Outcomes, 53 
119 S. Cretney ‘Marriage Saving and the Early days of Conciliation – The Role of Claude 
Mullins [1998] 10 CFLQ 161 
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involvement in the provision of guidance, counselling and other forms of assistance to those 
with problems in their personal relationships. 120
 
 
Mullins believed that the courts were wrong to see domestic disputes exclusively through a 
legal lens. Instead the courts should provide some form of extra-legal assistance.121 He 
wanted to introduce changes that would entail the court playing a therapeutic role: judges 
would advise and counsel the parties. In performing these functions, clearly ‘the court was to 
go far beyond its traditional role of applying ascertainable legal rules’.122
 
 
Cretney observes that proposals of this nature attracted criticism from lawyers and officials 
within the legal system.123 Such an approach was considered contrary to the proper 
administration of justice; it would confer on the court ‘functions of a non-judicial, advisory 
and patriarchal character’ that would be better carried out by some other organisation.124 The 
Harris Committee,125 which was set up to enquire into social services in the administration of 
justice, including conciliation, rejected any ‘blurring of the distinction between adjudication 
and social work’ and took the view that conciliation should be the preserve of the probation 
service.126
                                                 
120 Ibid. p 165. 
 
121 Ibid. p 166. 
122 Ibid. p 167 
123 Ibid. p 167 
124 Viscount Sankey, the Lord Chancellor, quoted by Cretney ‘Marriage Saving’, p 168 
125 Report of the Committee on Social Services in Magistrates Courts (Chairman: SW Harris 
(1936)) Cmd 5122 para 18, (cited by Cretney, ‘Marriage Saving’ p 174). 
126 J. Doughty ‘From Court Missionaries to Conflict Resolution: A Century of Family Court 
Welfare’ [2008] 20 CFLQ 135. Mullins’ suggestions were rejected. The most the court could 
do would be to identify which cases were suitable for conciliation (in the sense of 
reconciliation) and it would be the probation service that would deal with them. The courts 
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This dislike of venturing too far from the traditional role of the court was echoed in 1976 by 
the Law Commission which stated that the ‘primary function of any court is adjudication, and, 
while that certainly does not exhaust its functions, a careful limit must be set to any functions 
going beyond adjudication’.127 Similarly, the Finer Report distinguished the English view of a 
family court from that held in America, where such courts saw themselves ‘to be as much a 
therapeutic agency as a judicial institution’.128 In setting out the main criteria for a family 
court, the Committee included the requirement that it ‘must be an impartial judicial 
institution, regulating the rights of citizens and settling their disputes according to law’ and 
applying a ‘uniform set of legal rules’.129 That it should be a judicial institution which, ‘in 
dealing with family matters, does justice according to law’, was a ‘fundamental principle’ 
and, perhaps, ‘so obvious a point as hardly to be worth mentioning’.130   To ‘expand and 
systematise the welfare function, which is an essential part of the family court concept, carries 
risks, as well as potential advantages, which can be eliminated only by clear thinking and firm 
practice regarding boundaries’.131
                                                                                                                                                        
could supervise in a way consistent with the judicial function (Committee on Social Services 
in Magistrates Courts para 18, cited by Cretney, ‘Marriage Saving’ p 174 ). 
 The Committee went on to say that the court should not see 
people as ‘”clients” and still less as “patients” for whom the court process is one form of, or a 
preliminary to, “treatment” ….The aim must be to make adjudication and welfare march hand 
127  Law Commission (Law Com No 77, Report on Matrimonial Proceedings in Magistrates’ 
Courts, at para 4.12. 
128 DHSS (1974) Report of the Committee on One-Parent Families Cmnd 5629, Vol 1 
(London: HMSO) para 4.281-2.  
129Ibid. para 4.283 
130 Ibid. para 4.285. 
131Ibid. para 4.285. 
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in hand  but there should be no blurring at the edges’.132 And when the Children Act 1989 was 
being conceived, there was no significant support for judicial counselling or advice. The Law 
Commission declined to entertain suggestions that judges should mediate between parties and 
use their attendance at court as an opportunity to ‘suggest solutions and assist in reaching 
agreement’:133
 
 
[I]f the judge tries to promote a particular policy or view of the best arrangements, for 
example with regard to joint custody or the level of access, this could be thought incompatible 
with the requirement that each case be judged on its own individual merits in the light of all 
the circumstances. There is even a risk … that particular “hobby horses” will be ridden 
without outside scrutiny or a real opportunity to challenge. Essentially, therefore, these 
functions are more suitable for skilled welfare officers or social workers, and should not be 
expected of judges whose main task is to adjudicate upon disputes.134
 
 
While judges nowadays seem to dispense advice and promote their views about what is best 
for children in a way that the Law Commission could not have envisaged, they still agree with 
the consensus that they should not be in the business of providing counselling. They have for 
some time seen it as their role to promote settlements, to chide, threaten and occasionally 
punish family members in a bid to change behaviour. But changing minds or relationships is 
not something they see themselves as equipped to do. For example in one reported case the 
judge noted:  ‘This is a court of law….[A]ll I can do is determine disputes. It is up to the 
                                                 
132 Ibid. para 4.285.  
133 The Law Commission, Working Paper no 96 Family Law: Review of Child Law: Custody 
(London: HMSO, 1986) para 4.8(f). 
134Ibid.  para 4.9(f). 
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parents to parent Y in a way that does not harm him.’135 The parents, the judge continued, 
need to ‘voluntarily engage in some process to improve their relationship’136
 
 Similarly Wall 
LJ has recently reiterated the limits of the judicial function: 
If we have learned anything in the last 10 years it is, surely, that we must be able to foster 
contact non-forensically, that is to say, outside the courtroom. The court can act as the fact 
finder ….. It can properly decide what is in the best interests of a child. But the court cannot 
educate, the court cannot mediate: above all the court cannot work with parents, let alone 
children on a one to one basis over time outside the courtroom. This is the field of social work, 
and in the most difficult case, mental health expertise.137
 
 
In Re L, Thorpe L J made it clear that he did not think the court’s powers extended to 
regulating relationships138
 
 and went on:  
                                                 
135 Re A (Leave to Remove: Cultural and Religious Considerations) [2006] EWHC 421 
(Fam), [2006] 2 FLR 572 [57].  
136 Ibid. [58]. Even the more informal and interventionist approach observed among some 
judges in Scotland by Raitt seems directed more at informing judicial decision-making or 
facilitating settlement than changing minds. However at least one judge interviewed about his 
willingness to speak to children involved in contact disputes appeared to see himself as 
playing a therapeutic and problem-solving role rather than as imposing decisions: 
‘We get the parents round the table. We try to find out what the problem is. We try and find 
out how we can help cure that problem and we take it from there…. Basically the idea is a 
therapeutic form of justice, non-adversarial, trying to get problems…trying  to get parents to 
solve them for the children’136 (F. Raitt, ‘Hearing Children in Family Law Proceedings: Can 
judges Make a Difference?’ [2007] 19 CFLQ 204, 217)  
137 Wall ‘Making Contact Work in 2009’. 
138 Re L (Contact: Domestic Violence) p 364. 
 34 
[T]here is in my opinion validity in questioning the future role of the family justice system in 
relation to contact. I have already expressed how limited is the capacity of the family justice 
system to produce good outcomes in disputed areas of personal relationship. … [Contact] 
disputes are particularly prevalent and intractable. ….The disputes are often driven by 
personality disorders, unresolved adult conflicts or egocentricity. These originating or 
contributing factors would generally be better treated therapeutically, where at least there 
would be some prospect of beneficial change, rather than given vent in the family justice 
system…. 139
 
  
The court's capacity to resolve the challenge of what has been called the implacably hostile 
parent is evident. The practical difficulties posed by the power to commit are obvious. 
Treatment rather than imprisonment would seem more likely to succeed. However if it be 
unrealistic to question the continuing role of the family justice system in promoting post-
separation contact then I would express the hope that the newly created Children and Family 
Court Advisory and Support Service (CAFCASS) be given a role to address those aspects of 
the fractured relationships that the court in the exercise of its statutory and inherent powers 
cannot approach.140
 
 
Thorpe LJ gave expression to the new preoccupation with outcomes as well as to the hope 
that therapeutic intervention could be used to address the underlying problems fuelling the 
dispute and to heal relationships. But he was careful to stress the unsuitability of the legal 
system for these purposes. Hughes LJ, writing extra-judicially, made it clear that in his view 
the court is a neutral fact-finder concerned with the application of rules. He said that litigation 
                                                 
139Ibid. p 366.   
140 Ibid. p 367. 
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in the family courts ‘is not so different’.141
 
  ‘In essence’, he thought, ‘children litigation is like 
any other litigation; it is about bringing competing cases to a neutral seat of judgment’. It is 
‘about the legal rules for resolving issues about child welfare’. All that has changed is that 
judges now regard themselves as case managers as well as decision-makers. They control 
evidence, they give directions and they set a timetable. 
Nevertheless, despite all these disclaimers and expressions of aversion to anything other than 
neutral fact-finding, judges are increasingly seeking to manage cases in a way that not only 
leads to efficient decision-making but to securing a particular outcome: sustainable contact.142
 
  
That the courts feel that their role is to achieve that particular outcome can be seen from the 
research of Hunt and Macleod. They record numerous cases where courts made enormous 
efforts to get contact going. Judges called for welfare reports and psychological assessments. 
They ordered supervised contact. They listed cases for review. They were not merely making 
decisions about whether there should be contact orders and if, so what form contact should 
take. Indeed some of those professionals interviewed for the study thought that at times the 
courts tried too hard;143
 
 they were attempting to ensure that contact happened and, perhaps, 
even that it ‘worked’. 
                                                 
141 The Rt Hon Lord Justice Hughes ‘The Children Act 1989: A Different Sort of Litigation?’ 
[2008] Fam law 1008, 1015.  
142 Both judicial job dissatisfaction and a perceived loss of public confidence in the courts 
have been identified as key factors in the drive to establish problem-solving courts (J. Nolan 
Jr, Legal Accents, Legal Borrowing. The International Problem-Solving Court Movement 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009) pp 8-9). 
143 Hunt & Macleod, Outcomes, p222. 
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The reported cases likewise show that the courts have been active in trying to achieve the 
desired outcomes. In Re C (Contact Order: Variation) the court, albeit dealing with a 
technical matter, said: ‘Where a contact order is not operating smoothly, the court that made 
the order has a continuing responsibility to strive to make it work’.144 To this end, the courts 
have referred cases to the NYAS;145 they have recommended anger management to abusers; 
and they have instructed mothers to attend counselling, even, in at least a few reported cases, 
where domestic violence had been proven.146
 
  
Now an even more outcome-oriented role for the court is being developed. In the Midlands, 
family judges and magistrates have drafted a statement of ‘judicial expectations’ for those 
parents who come to court.147 This is intended to make clear to parents not only that they are 
expected to come to an agreement about contact, but that they must agree arrangements 
considered ‘appropriate’ by the court. To allow parents to assume that disputes are decided on 
a case by case basis and in accordance with the paramountcy principle is regarded as 
‘unhelpful’ because it allows parents ‘the freedom to contemplate an outcome (and become 
entrenched in that view) when that outcome might be far away from that which a court would 
be contemplating’.148
                                                 
144 [2008] EWCA Civ 1389; [2009] 1 FLR 869 [13]. 
 Mr Justice McFarlane, recommending that a national statement of 
145 See, for example,  Re A-H (Contact Order) [2008] EWCA Civ 630, [2008] 2 FLR 1188. 
146 See, for example, Re A-T (Children) [2008] EWCA Civ 652, [2008] All ER (D) 164 
(May) (CA) However in this case the judge’s order was overturned; there were no counsellors 
available. 
147 Midland Region Family Judges and Magistrates (2009) What the Family Courts Expect 
from Parents http://www.hmcourts-service.gov.uk/cms/files/family_final.pdf (accessed 30 
April 2010). 
148 E. Walsh. ‘Newsline Extra: Parental Responsibility: A National Statement’ [2009] Fam 
Law 632, 633. 
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judicial expectations be devised, has argued that this initiative must be ‘judge driven and 
driven by judges alone’. Every parent should understand ‘that the judges themselves (rather 
than being blank ciphers) have expectations of how a parent should discharge their 
responsibility in these circumstances’.149
 
   
Those expectations are clearly expressed: 
The court therefore expects you to do what is best for your child: 
• Encourage your child to have a good relationship with both of you. 
• Try to have a good enough relationship with each other as parents, even though you are no 
longer together as a couple. 
• Arrange for your child to spend time with each of you.150
 
 
For parents who do not come to the ‘right’ agreement, other measures are in place. Among 
these are education and therapeutic intervention and courts, while they still ‘outsource’ these 
services, are expected to make greater use of them. In 2000 Douglas et al151 recommended 
that courts should act as an ‘initial information resource and referral point’, directing parents 
and children on a voluntary basis to services such as counselling.152
                                                 
149 Ibid. 633. 
 The arrangements in 
place come close to this.  Courts hearing more difficult cases are expected to consider the 
need for therapeutic intervention; the Practice Direction governing cases involving allegations 
of domestic violence empowers the court, with the consent of the person concerned, to direct 
150 Midland Region Family Judges and Magistrates, What the Family Court Expects (bold in 
original). 
151 G. Douglas, M. Murch, L. Scanlon and A. Perry, ‘Safeguarding Children’s Welfare in 
Non-Contentious Divorce: Towards a New Conception of the Legal Process’ [2000] 63 MLR 
177. 
152 Douglas et al, ‘Safeguarding’, p 193-4. 
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a party to seek advice or treatment.153 The Practice Direction issued in terms of the revised 
Private Law Programme requires the court at the first hearing in all cases to consider ‘[w]hat 
other options there are for resolution e.g. may the case be suitable for further intervention by 
Cafcass; mediation by an external provider; collaborative law or use of a parenting plan?’154  
It also refers to the requirement that consideration be given to attendance at Parenting 
Information Programmes or other activities, whether court ordered in terms of s11 of the 
Children Act as amended or not.155
 
 
In terms of the amendments to the Children Act 1989, the courts can order litigants to seek 
help to change their behaviour and the courts can punish them if they do not seek that help or, 
indeed, if they do not change. It is the behaviour of the litigants and its cause, the bad state of 
their relationship, that need to be addressed. The courts are cast in a key role as part of the 
problem solving machinery. 
 
The legislation creates new orders and new measures to penalize breaches. A court hearing a 
contact case can make contact activity directions156 and, on making a contact order, can 
impose contact activity conditions.157 A person subject to a contact activity direction or 
condition is required to ‘take part in an activity that promotes contact.’158
 
 This could include 
attendance at:  
                                                 
153 Practice Direction (Residence and Contact Orders: Domestic Violence and Harm). 
154 Practice Direction, The Revised Private Law Programme, para 5.2(c). 
155 Ibid. para 5.2(d). 
156 Section 11A Children Act 1989. 
157 Section 11C. The same applies when the court varies a contact order. 
158 Sections 11A(3) and 11C(2). 
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(a) programmes, classes and counselling or guidance sessions of a kind that-  
(i) may assist a person as regards establishing, maintaining or improving contact with a 
child; 
(ii) may, by addressing a person’s violent behaviour, enable or facilitate contact with a 
child; 
(b) sessions in which information or advice is given as regards making or operating arrangements 
for contact with a child, including making arrangements by means of mediation.159
 
 
The court may ask a Cafcass officer to monitor compliance with contact activity directions or 
conditions and to report any breach.160 Compliance with contact orders may also be 
monitored and a Cafcass officer can be charged, for up to a year, with reporting breaches of 
these too.161 Breach of a contact activity condition or a condition attached to a contact order 
under s 11(7) of the Act constitutes breach of a contact order.162 Any breach of a contact order 
may lead to the making of an enforcement order imposing on the parent an unpaid work 
requirement.163 Compliance with that too can be monitored.164
 
 The power to impose an 
unpaid work requirement is in addition to the courts’ normal powers to punish for contempt of 
court as well as the power to transfer residence from one parent to another. Doubtless, judges 
will also continue to use less coercive methods; they will still seek to persuade non-compliant 
mothers by impressing on them the need to do the ‘right thing’. 
                                                 
159 Section 11A(5). See also s11C(5). 
160 Section 11G. 
161 Section 11H. 
162 Children and Adoption Act 2006, Explanatory Notes, para 30. 
163 Section 11J. There is also a power to order financial compensation for financial loss 
caused by a breach (s11O). 
164 Section 11M. 
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In order to give effect to the reforms, the DCSF165 commissioned provision for parenting 
programmes- Making Contact Safe, Making Contact Work - ‘designed to support attending 
parents with information on the divorce process, how it can affect them and their children and 
how to change things for the better. The intention is to encourage safe contact between a child 
and an individual by the end of the programme’.166 These typically involve two two-hour 
groupwork sessions.167 There are also intensive, 60 hour long, domestic violence perpetrator 
programmes.168 Finally, information about mediation is provided through the Legal Services 
Commission.169
 
 
The court must consider the suitability of the party to engage in the activity prescribed. In 
practice the Cafcass officer will be likely to have suggested to the court that an activity might 
be beneficial.170
                                                 
165 The DCSF has also designated 10 pilot areas in a project designed to determine how best 
local services can be co-ordinated for divorcing and separating parents: E. Walsh, ‘Newsline 
Extra: Support for Separated Parents’ [2009] Fam Law 1220. 
 The attitude of the person concerned will be a ‘key consideration’. In the case 
of parenting information both parties are required to attend albeit separately. In the case of 
domestic violence programmes the person concerned is required to attend if he has conceded 
166 DCSF (undated) ‘Government Response to the consultation on the proposals for the new 
subsidy arrangements to support individuals taking  part in contact activities directed or so 
ordered by the courts’ p7 
(www.dcsf.gov.uk/.../Contact%20Activity%20Summary%20of%20Responses%20Final.doc, 
accessed 10 May 2010). 
167 Guidance to Cafcass Practitioners on their roles in supporting the courts in their use of 
the section 11A provisions, Children Act 1989 (as inserted by the Children and Adoption Act 
2006) para 2.2. Resolution is piloting information workshops: G. Morris, ‘Resolution: 
Parenting After Parting: Information Workshops for Parents’ [2009] Fam Law 984. 
168 Guidance to Cafcass Practitioners, para 2.2. 
169 DCSF, Government Response, p7. 
170 Guidance to Cafcass Practitioners, para 2.4. 
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his violence or has been found through a finding of fact process to have been violent. It is 
intended that support services will also be offered to the victim and current partner of the 
perpetrator.171
 
 
The extent to which the new powers are being used is yet to be documented but anecdotal 
evidence suggests that little use has been made of them. 172  In addition, it appears that the 
kinds of intervention available are limited. It is also thought that funding to enable people to 
attend programmes is a problem.173
 
 Nevertheless, the potential for use is there. And the 
existence of these measures points to a change in the function of the family court. The use by 
the judiciary of their authority to persuade parents to change their behaviour, their newer 
concern with addressing underlying problems in order to secure particular outcomes and the 
new powers created by the legislation, mean that the family courts now have some of the 
characteristics of problem solving courts. 
9. Problem-Solving Courts 
The concept of problem-solving courts animated by the theories and practices of therapeutic 
jurisprudence174 is well-established in the USA. According to Nolan,175
                                                 
171 Ibid. para 2.5. 
 these courts address 
172 B. Sayers, ‘In Practice: Contact Activities’ [2009] Fam Law 617. 
173 Personal communication from Adrienne Barnett, barrister, Sept 2009. 
174 Therapeutic jurisprudence requires a multidisciplinary response to problem behaviours. It 
requires that  judges refer people for treatment with and that they become involved in 
monitoring (M. Alberstein, ‘Therapeutic Keys of Law: Reflections on the Power and 
Limitations of an Alternative Movement, A Book Review of Judging in a Therapeutic Key: 
Therapeutic Jurisprudence and The Courts’ (Bruce J. Winick and David B. Wexler, eds.)’ 
(2006) 39 Israel Law Rev. 140, 148). 
175 Nolan, Legal Accents,  p 10. 
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the problems of individual parties, usually offenders. They also address the problem of the 
perceived need for the court system to regain legitimacy in the wake of a feared loss of public 
confidence. In addition they step in where social institutions have failed to address social ills. 
To this end they use, among other strategies, judicial monitoring, a therapeutic orientation, a 
change in traditional judicial roles and an emphasis on solving the underlying problems of 
parties.176
 
  
Problem-solving courts are predicated on the belief that courts can play a part in finding 
solutions to problems, that outcomes and not just process and precedent matter. As an 
American judge explains, they aim to ‘achieve more constructive interventions than 
conventional case resolutions, which often do not solve the underlying problem…that brings 
the same people back to court again and again’.177 There is a ‘recognition that the coercive 
power of courts can change people’s behaviour’178 and there is an emphasis on compliance 
monitoring, in which the judge is involved,179 with ‘clear consequences for non-
compliance’.180
                                                 
176Ibid. p 11. 
 Judges, who speak directly to offenders, use their status to ‘encourage 
177 J. S. Kaye, ‘Delivering Justice Today: A Problem-Solving Approach’ (2004) 22 Yale L. 
and Policy Review 125. 
178 R. V. Wolf, ‘Don’t Reinvent the Wheel. Lessons from Problem-Solving Courts’,  (New 
York: The US Department of Justice’s Community-Based Problem-Solving Criminal Justice 
Initiative. Center for Court Innovation.  Bureau of Justice Assistance, 2007) p1 
(http://www.courtinnovation.org/_uploads/documents/Dont%20Reinvent.pdf, accessed 11 
May 2010). 
179 G. Berman and J. Feinblatt ‘Problem-Solving Courts: A Brief Primer’ (2001) 23 Law and 
Policy 125, 129. 
180 Wolf, ‘Don’t Reinvent the Wheel’ fig, 1. 
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offender compliance’, to ‘support collaboration’ between agencies and to move beyond 
process to outcome.181
 
  
Alberstein tells us that: 
 
They represent a shift in the perception of the role of courts, which are not only expected to 
resolve the dispute before them, but also to attempt to address the variety of human problems 
which are responsible for bringing the case to court. By dealing with the underlying problem 
which is responsible for the immediate dispute, courts are supposed to prevent recurring court 
involvement for the individuals before them.182
 
  
Berman and Feinblatt say that: 
 
Problem-solving courts…. seek to broaden the focus of legal proceedings, from simply 
adjudicating past facts and legal issues to changing the future behavior of litigants and 
ensuring the future well-being of communities.183
 
 
However Berman and Feinblatt also draw attention to some of the disadvantages. They raise 
the possibility that problem solving judges might impose treatment regimes on defendants 
‘without reference to the complexity of individual’s problems.’184
                                                 
181Ibid, p 7. See also M. Burton, ‘Judicial Monitoring of Compliance: Introducing “Problem 
Solving” Approaches to Domestic Violence Courts in England and Wales’ (2006) 20 Int J of 
LP&F 366 -78. 
 They also suggest that 
punishments for defendants who fail to comply might be harsher than those they would have 
182 Alberstein, ‘Therapeutic Keys of Law’, p 143. 
183 G. Berman and J. Feinblatt, ‘Problem-Solving Courts’ p 126. 
184 Ibid. p. 134. 
 44 
faced originally. Moreover, courts imposing the penalties may have done little to ensure that 
the social services interventions they mandate are effective.185 Singer, writing about the 
therapeutic orientation of the family courts in the USA, notes that this development ’enhances 
the role of non-legal professionals’,186 may detract from the courts’ ‘fundamental role as a 
forum for fair187 and authoritative dispute resolution’ and may divert services from the wider 
community.188
 
  
In England, problem solving courts have been set up to address the same sorts of issues and 
they use the same sorts of strategies. Unlike courts in the United States, they do not feature 
clients’ ‘tearful testimonies’, audience applause, graduation ceremonies,189 or judges handing 
out doughnuts.190 However, they do use monitoring, they use the coercive power of the court 
in the form of judicial persuasion and they adopt a therapeutic approach. This is apparent, for 
example, in at least one specialist domestic violence court191 as well as the new Drug and 
Alcohol court currently being piloted.192
                                                 
185 Ibid. p. 135. 
 
186 J. Singer, ‘Dispute Resolution and the Postdivorce Family: Implications of a Paradigm 
Shift’ (2009) 47 Family Court Review 363, 364. 
187 See also Nolan, Legal Accents,  p193. 
188 Singer, ‘Dispute Resolution and the Postdivorce Family’,  p 367. 
189 Nolan, Legal Accents,, p 12. 
190 Ibid. p74. 
191 See M. Hester, J. Pearce and N. Westmarland, Early Evaluation of the Integrated Domestic 
Violence Court, Croydon. Ministry of Justice Research Series 18/8 (London: MOJ. 2008) para 
2.6. 
192 See A.Hill, ‘Pioneering Court Offers Hope to Addict Mothers’ The Observer 05.07.09, p 
18; FDAC Research Team, Brunel University, The Family Drug and Alcohol Court (FDAC) 
Interim Report (2009) http://www.brunel.ac.uk/doc/1311/FDACIRAugust2009.pdf (accessed 
11/9/09). 
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As is apparent from the reported cases and from the findings of Hunt and Macleod, the family 
courts had begun to adopt similar ways of dealing with parties even prior to the amendment of 
the Children Act 1989. Already family courts were using adjournments to review and hence 
monitor contact.  Already, judges were seeking to use their authority to persuade mothers to 
accede to contact despite their fears for their children. Now, under the amended legislation, 
the powers are more coercive. Courts are empowered to impose treatment regimes or at least 
counselling or educational retraining on parents and, in the majority of cases, the parents 
concerned are likely to be mothers resisting contact. 
 
Insofar as they adopt comparable approaches, our family courts will be open to criticisms 
similar to those levelled at problem-solving courts. The education or counselling on offer, 
when and if these are made more widely available,193 are not necessarily going to be 
appropriate or effective. Walker et al, for example reported that parents wanted information 
and advice tailored to their needs and wanted it to take account of changing situations. There 
was ‘little evidence’ that the information meetings piloted in terms of the now defunct 
provisions of  the Family Law Act 1996 had a significant effect on behaviour.194
 
  
                                                 
193 Hunt and Macleod report a degree of scepticism among their interviewees concerning the 
effectiveness of these measures and the resources available to give effect to them (Hunt & 
Macleod, Outcomes, pp 225-226). However the response to the possibility of parenting 
classes was positive (p 225). Wall LJ has stressed the need for resources (‘Making Contact 
Work in 2009’, 591. Some indication of the limited services available is provided  by Sayers, 
‘In Practice: Contact Activities’. 
194 Walker et al,  Picking up the Pieces, Executive Summary, Ch 11. However the Resolution 
information workshops currently being piloted in six areas do appear to met with parental 
approval (Weekend Woman’s Hour, 4.00pm Saturday 18 July BBC Radio 4).   
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Even if the services available could be tailored to individual needs, there are serious 
objections. May and Smart, for example, suggest that the courts are engaging in ‘micro-
management’ of family life and that they ‘do not have the appropriate knowledge and tools to 
succeed in this goal’.195 Other objections stem from the way in which the available knowledge 
is interpreted and applied; there is a failure on the part of the courts and welfare professionals 
such as Cafcass officers196
 
 to take account of ‘the complexities of individuals’ problems’ and 
also of the complexities of child welfare knowledge. This failure can lead them to wrongly 
identify one parent, usually the resident mother, as the problem. 
10. The Main Problem with the Problem-Solving Approach 
The effect of a more problem-solving approach on mothers is as yet unclear. Yet in the light 
of the prioritization of contact and the continued perception of mothers who oppose it as 
obstructive, one may speculate that they will be put under increased pressure.  
 
The designation of mothers as the problem means that they are in effect to be dealt with by 
the family courts in a way that is not entirely different from the way in which problem solving 
courts deal with violent abusers and drug users. In the same way that, for example, drug users 
are the focus of the problem-solving measures, so mothers are likely to be the target of 
intervention to facilitate contact. It is likely to be the mother who is cast firmly as the person 
who is at fault or the person who needs to change.  
                                                 
195 V. May and C. Smart, ‘The Parenting Contest: Problems of Ongoing Conflict Over 
Children’ in Parenting after Partnering, M. Maclean (ed.) (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2007)  
pp78-9. 
196 Cafcass is expected to engage in problem solving. See Parental Separation; Children’s 
Need and Parents’ Responsibilities (2004 HM Government)  para 10. Advice to the court on 
the necessity and suitability in any case of therapeutic or educational intervention is expected 
to come from Cafcass officers who are largely pro-contact. See Hunt and Macleod, Outcomes. 
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Indeed in the recent case of Re P (Children), 197 the Court of Appeal, determined to deal with 
‘the true underlying issue’198  in a contact case, was willing to consider recommending 
counselling for a mother whom the judge in the court below had concluded was truthful and 
not suffering from any mental disorder.199 The therapy, it was said, ‘might go some little way 
to assuaging the father’s implacable conviction that she is a woman with severe mental 
problems such as to spill over to the detriment of his children’.200 The father, who had been 
back to court 66 times,201 and who had engaged in what the court considered ‘less serious’ 
violence,202 was expected to seek help in the form of anger management classes. However the 
court clearly sympathized with his point of view; he needed an arena in which he could 
‘explain his feelings of anger and bitterness’ resulting from the marriage breakdown and 
difficulties over the children (who were refusing to see him):203 ‘It is enough to make any 
ordinary man just a little bit angry, but that anger has to be contained….hence the need for 
him to subject himself to what may be the humiliation of counselling and therapy’.204
 
 That the 
mother might be distressed at attending therapy that she appeared not to need, was not 
mentioned. 
                                                 
197 Re P (Children) [2008] EWCA Civ 1431 
198 Ibid. [36]. 
199 Ibid. [24]. 
200 Ibid. [37] 
201 Ibid. [4] 
202 Ibid. [5]. 
203 One of the children stated that, if his father shouted at him or smacked him, he would curl 
up and hide his face. He also feared that his father would not return him home after contact 
(Ibid. [31]).  
204 Ibid. [36]. The court also seemed to sympathize with the fact that a ‘proud, intelligent 
father’ had been humiliated by the findings of domestic violence against him. 
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While it might seem appropriate to subject a violent person or a substance misuser to 
treatment, education and monitoring, it is questionable whether it is appropriate for 
recalcitrant mothers. For one thing, these mothers often do have salient reasons for opposing 
contact. To treat such mothers as being in need of counselling to help them to become 
reconciled to contact is to pathologize their frequently very real and well-founded worries. 
And as far as education in the form of parenting classes is concerned, this is likely to be 
relatively ineffective. It is not lack of knowledge that makes mothers resist contact. Research 
suggests that mothers tend to accept and tend to have internalized the dominant welfare 
discourse that prioritizes contact as being best for children. What they do not accept is that 
contact is good for their children. On the contrary, they see themselves as protecting their 
children from harm which they believe is likely to result from contact with an abusive or 
uninvolved former partner; they perceive themselves as fighting for their children’s best 
interests by opposing contact.205
 
 
Admittedly, in some cases, as in Re P, it will be fathers who will be sent to classes or 
programmes. However it appears that even then the aim could be to get the mothers to 
change; some fathers might be sent to anger management or parenting education not only to 
improve their behaviour but also to allay resident mothers’ concerns about violence or poor 
parenting capacity, so making them more amenable to contact.206
 
 
                                                 
205 Day Sclater & Kaganas ‘Contact: Mothers, Welfare and Rights’;  Kaganas & S Day 
Sclater ‘Contact Disputes: Narrative Constructions of “Good Parents”’ . 
206 See Re P (Children) [2008] EWCA Civ 1431, para 26. The NYAS recommended  that the 
father should attend counselling so that the mother, if he could at least begin to understand the 
effects of his behaviour,  might be reassured and so become more supportive of contact. 
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Nevertheless it must be conceded that the new measures may lead to the resolution of some 
disputes. Intervention, whether aimed at fathers or mothers, might lead to greater maternal 
acceptance of contact. In particular, the new measures may be quite useful in ‘persuading’ 
mothers who would otherwise ‘get away with’ unreasonable behaviour. As one judge in Hunt 
and Macleod’s study said:  
 
Committal doesn’t work because nobody is prepared to do it. And the real hard core know 
that. But if there is a lesser punishment. If you’re going to have to do community service 
every weekend it might trigger a few cases.207
 
  
But the consequences of using these powers could be seriously detrimental to mothers and 
their children in many cases. Moreover, intervention to get mothers to change their attitudes 
and their ways by means of these ‘lesser’ punishments may be followed up with more 
coercive intervention.208
 
  
It has been suggested by a Cafcass Acting Head of Service that there are some cases where 
contact cannot and should not take place and the courts ought not to assume that it should. If 
an ‘educative, therapeutic approach’ does not yield results, further applications should be 
rejected; ‘If the situation cannot be changed, the process should stop’.209
                                                 
207 Judge quoted by Hunt & Macleod, Outcomes,  p 226. 
 However this advice 
runs contrary to current thinking. It is more likely that the courts will regard a failure to attend 
classes or counselling in accordance with an order, or will regard attendance that is not 
208 The potential for punitive use of the provisions is noted by Cantwell (B Cantwell  ‘In 
Practice: the Emotional Safeguarding of Children in Private Law [2010] Fam Law 84, 89-90; 
 Wall, ‘Making Contact Work in 2009’.  
209 S Adams ‘Parents’ Rights v Children’s Needs in Private cases’ [2007] Fam Law 257, 258.  
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followed by change, as evidence of mothers’ unreasonableness justifying further punishment. 
Resistance to re-education, for instance, may serve as proof that more coercive measures are 
warranted. That there is some substance to this speculation is demonstrated by the words of 
another judge quoted by Hunt and Macleod: 
 
I can certainly see the need in some cases to change those attitudes….It will be interesting to 
see whether the mum in that case would consider attending those classes. And what do you do 
if she won’t? I suppose it gives strength to the arm of enforcement. It reinforces the fact that 
this is an implacable case.210
  
  
 
11. Conclusion 
The court is considered an unsuitable forum for dealing with contact disputes but it is 
nevertheless expected to resolve the most intractable cases. The court is also now responsible 
for ensuring that the parties ‘make contact work’.  The traditional role of the court as 
decision-maker has therefore expanded: courts are charged with, and accept the task of, 
securing the desired outcome: ‘good’ contact.   
 
For some years mothers who oppose contact or disobey orders have been constructed as the 
problem. What has changed is the way in which the legislature, and the courts themselves, 
have decided how to approach this problem.  The solution chosen is to enable family courts to 
act in a way analogous to problem-solving courts. What family courts are ‘for’, now, includes 
not only seeking to persuade parents (mainly mothers) to comply but also deciding to refer 
them to services so that they address their underlying problems. Courts have become part of a 
                                                 
210 Hunt and Macleod, Outcomes,  p 226.  
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therapeutic network being deployed to change attitudes and behaviour. Conversely, helping 
agencies have now become part of the disciplinary framework governing families, and in 
particular resident mothers. These ‘helping’ services have in effect been incorporated into the 
family justice toolkit, backed up by punishment. What is happening here appears to be at least 
the beginnings of a blurring between adjudication and social work, the very blurring that was 
warned against in earlier years. What the implications of this might be remain to be seen.  
 
While an approach akin to a ‘therapeutic’ or ‘problem solving’ one may not be intrinsically 
oppressive, in the context of the pro-contact and outcome oriented culture of the family court, 
it can serve to increase pressure on mothers. It may be that court personnel will be even more 
easily able to mount hobby horses on the authority of a selective and simplified version of 
child welfare knowledge.  
 
If mothers, despite real and well-founded misgivings, do not accede to contact, the courts’ 
new zeal coupled with their new powers increase the possibility that mothers could subjected 
to unnecessary and unwanted education or counselling. Courts may be far more willing to 
send mothers for what will be seen as helpful and benign intervention than they might be to 
impose immediate punitive sanctions. Yet the new powers also make punitive sanctions more 
likely;  if mothers do not respond to ‘help’ or ‘education’, their non-co-operation and 
continued opposition may well be seen as justifying the penalty of community service or even 
harsher measures 
 
There is a difference between the ‘problems’ facing, say, domestic violence or drug courts 
and those facing family courts. There is some consensus that violence and addiction are 
generally negative in their effects but it is not so clear cut that mothers who oppose contact 
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are causing harm. It cannot be assumed that most mothers who are in this position are simply 
obdurate and are trying to ‘get away with’ bad behaviour. It cannot be assumed that where 
measures such as supervised contact are adopted, mothers should be reassured that contact is 
‘safe’, workable or positive. It cannot be assumed that judicial scrutiny of consent orders will 
bring to light cases of fear, pressure and intimidation. Yet as long as the courts and many of 
the professionals involved in contact disputes subscribe to the view that contact is almost 
always in the child’s best interests, the legitimate concerns of resident mothers will continue 
to be sidelined. And as long as the prevailing belief is that courts can make contact ‘work’, 
resistance will simply be met with intensified intervention. Many mothers and their children 
are likely to be worse off as a result. 
 
 
 
